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Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

Appeals -- summary judgment and evidence

When considering a summary judgment, the standard for review at the appeals level is "de novo" -- this is well established. However, what, if any, restrictions exist as to what evidence may be presented outside of what was originally show to the lower court. How "de novo" is de novo. It is worth a brief discussion on the point. Hanover Law recently filed a responsive brief on just this topic, and I expect the appeals court to issue a ruling in, uh, about three years. However, I thought I would share my research for others dealing with the same topic.

The standard for summary judgment is outlined in McFarland v. George Washington Univ., 935 A.2d 337 (D.C., 2007): This court reviews "the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo." Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 368 (D.C. 2003). "[T]o be entitled to summary judgment, [GW] must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that [it is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (en banc) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 (c)). Although we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "[c]onclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment." Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 760 A.2d 563, 570 (D.C. 2000) (citation omitted).

As a footnote, "conclusory allegations" are generally defined as those made by the party him/herself. You can't submit an affidavit purporting to be fact, when it contains only the statements of the party.

"Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered." Hahn v. Diaz-Barba, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). This last one is critical, as it is as hard to find statements regarding evidentiary restrictions on lower Court's orders, in appeal decisions, as it is to pull hens teeth.

Do you have a question regarding appeals? We can help! We're experienced trial and appeal court litigators, and would be delighted to discuss your case. 1-800-579-9864 or admin@hanoverlawpc.com.

Hanover Law, PC
Offices in Fairfax, VA and Washington, DC
www.hanoverlawpc.com
2751 Prosperity Ave, Ste 150
Fairfax, VA 22031
Sean R. Hanover, Esq.
Stephen Salwierak, Esq.
1-800-579-9864
admin@hanoverlawpc.com

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Appealing Jury Verdicts -- the standards and the risks

It is worth noting the standard of review for jury trial verdicts in most appeals courts. The following is from the DC Court of Appeals, but most states follow a similar position: when the jury decides an issue of fact, the appeals court cannot change it unless there is absolutely no evidence to support the jury finding.

(a) In considering an order or judgment of a lower court (or any of its divisions or branches) brought before it for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall review the record on appeal. When the issues of fact were tried by jury, the court shall review the case only as to matters of law. When the case was tried without a jury, the court may review both as to the facts and the law, but the judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. D.C. Code §17–305 (2016).

"As an appellate court we have no power to retry factual issues; our authority is restricted to a review for errors of law." District of Columbia v. Harris, 770 A.2d 82, 89 (D.C. 2001) citing to Sachs v. Eller, 89 A.2d 644, 645 (D.C. 1952).


Notwithstanding 17-305, the Court of Appeals will not disturb a jury's verdict if there is "any substantial evidence which will support the conclusion reached." Boynton v. Lopez, 473 A.2d 375, 376 (D.C. 1984). "Substantial evidence repeatedly has been defined as more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Reese v. Newman, 2016 D.C. App. LEXIS 36 (D.C. Feb. 11, 2016) citing to Wheeler v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 395 A.2d 85, 89 (D.C. 1978).

When no jury is present, the Appeals Court can entertain an argument that the facts were improperly considered by the trial court, however, the review is generally at the "abuse of discretion" level, and is often hard to overturn. Note, though, that as a strategy matter, bench trials can have the facts reviewed, where jury trials rarely, if ever, do.

Also, be careful of filing an appeal at all -- on the defensive, as the appellee, you have no choice but to respond; however, as the appellant, if you file foolishly, you will have to pay the court fees, appendix costs, and other attorney fees if you lose. This should always be a salient consideration when attacking facts in an appeal.

Do you need help with an appeal in Virginia, Maryland, DC or Federal Court? Call us! We can help. 1-800-579-9864 or email us at admin@hanoverlawpc.com.

Hanover Law, PC
Offices in Fairfax, VA and Washington, DC
www.hanoverlawpc.com
2751 Prosperity Ave, Ste 150
Fairfax, VA 22031
Sean R. Hanover, Esq.
Stephen Salwierak, Esq.
1-800-579-9864
admin@hanoverlawpc.com

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

O1 determination ignored for EB1 - what the heck!

Recently, I was asked to help on a last minute EB-1 appeal. After researching the case, we came across the fact this individual had already been approved for an O-1 visa -- for 10 years! The AAO adjudicator told the client that he was lying and that the USCIS finding that he was eligible for an O-1 was wrong. Based one...nothing.

This is the section of the appeal we wrote concerning this point.

4. In the instant case, Dr. XXX was previously awarded an O-1 visa as an individual of extraordinary ability in the arts or sciences. See, initial AAO Appeal Decision dated 26 Jan 2015, page 4. While there is nothing requiring USCIS to approve petitioner because of a prior approval, ere is a strong precedent to remain consistent with the application of law and fact. In the appeal decision dated 26 Jan 2015, the Appeals Examiner repeatedly sites to errors of law and fact in the original adjudication of the O-1. There is simply nothing provided to support the utter and complete discount of the prior grant of “extraordinary” status. While this, itself may not be enough to cause an EB1 to be valid, it is unreasonable that such a prior decision should not:
a. Be useable by the petitioner as a demonstration that, when all the factors are taken in the aggregate (See, Kazarian at 1117; Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F Supp 3d 126, 131-132 (D.D.C, 2013) he meets the extraordinary standard, and
b. As evidence of either:
i. Documentation of the alien’s receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor;
ii. Evidence of the alien’s original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related contributions of major significance in the field;

Either of these 8 C.F.R. §204.5(h)(3), or both, are appropriate for an O-1 designation because for 4(b)(i) above, the O-1 visa is a recognized document awarded only to those who have extraordinary ability; for 4(b)(ii), the O-1 visa constitutes affirmative evidence that the United States has recognized the extraordinary nature of the petitioners abilities in the arts, sciences, or other professional field.

5. It should also be noted that the O-1 visa is only awarded to those individuals who, other than entertainers or artist, meet the extraordinary standard no less stringent that EB-1. Extraordinary ability in science, education, business or athletics means “a level of expertise indicating that the person is one of the small percentages who have arisen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” 8 CFR 214.2(o)(3)(ii). By USCIS awarding Dr. XXX an O-1 visa, they have previously validated the fact he has risen “to the very top of the field of endeavor.” Indeed, Dr. XXX held this visa for 10 years.

6. The Appeals Examiner argues that the AAO is not bound by USCIS determinations at a lower level, and therefore, the AAO is free to ignore the prior O visa awarded to the petitioner. See, page 4, last paragraph.

7. This is in error, as it creates an impossibly chaotic system where decisions of USCIS are randomly overturned, without any express reason, by the AAO. As here, the Appeals Examiner simply determined the O visa was in error, and gave absolutely zero supporting justification for that holding.

8. The Appeals Officer further cites to Glara Fashion Inc. v. Holder, 11 CIV. 889 (PAE) 2012 WL 352309 *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, this case only gives the AAO the right to modify earlier USCIS holdings when there is a clear error at law in the prior decision, and that law has been articulated to the petitioner (who has had a chance to rebut the same). Further, Glara Fashion states, from the government’s own brief, that “aribtrariness” may be inferred from an inexplicable departure from a previous agency holding. (See, Glara at 20). Nothing was submitted that showed clear error, and even if the Appeals Officer had seen a clear error of law, Dr. XXX would have had the opportunity to rebut the error and argue the case before a finding that his O visa was given in error. See, 8 C.F.R. 103.5(5)(ii) which states: Service motion with decision that may be unfavorable to affected party. When a Service officer, on his or her own motion, reopens a Service proceeding or reconsiders a Service decision, and the new decision may be unfavorable to the affected party, the officer shall give the affected party 30 days after service of the motion to submit a brief. The officer may extend the time period for good cause shown. If the affected party does not wish to submit a brief, the affected party may waive the 30-day period.

Do you have a question about a visa, or EB/O extraordinary qualifications? Give us a call before you need to pay for an appeal! 1-800-579-9864 or admin@hanoverlawpc.com.

Hanover Law, PC
Offices in Fairfax, VA and Washington, DC
www.hanoverlawpc.com
2751 Prosperity Ave, Ste 150
Fairfax, VA 22031
Sean R. Hanover, Esq.
Stephen Salwierak, Esq.
Lili O'connell, Esq.
Charles Hatley, Esq.
1-800-579-9864 admin@hanoverlawpc.com

Federal Appeals: Discretionary Appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)

This is a quick article outlining the process for interlocutory appeals in the midst of a federal lawsuit. When the court has ruled on a summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, an appeal may be requested. It is not automatic, and the District Court must approve. Note that appeal work is tricky. There are subtle nuances. A final decision as to liability (i.e. summary judgment as to liability) but not to damages, is not a final decision within the purview of Rule 54(b) and therefore can not be taken under that rule. Mr. Jeremy Doernberger, an associate at Anukem Law in Maryland, did an excellent review of this recently. If you are considering a Rule 54(b) appeal, a good case at bar is Bell Microproducts, Inc. v. Global-Sync, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942 (E.D. Va. 1998). However, what if you do not have a final judgment -- that is, you have judgment as to liability, but not as to damages? Rule 54(b) won't work, and you are left with....

28 U.S.C. §1292(b)

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

This code section is the great catch-all for any appeal taken as a to matter that really has no home...it's not a final disposition, but it impacts the case. As always, any appeal taken during the course of the litigation requires District Court approval, and it is not likely to be forthcoming. However, if you have a dispute at law (that means an argument about how certain legal principals were applied to the facts, or whether given legal principals should apply at all), it can be be a handy way of framing an issue before the District Court. The District Court is always free to "reconsider" it's prior decision and change holding on a summary judgment or interlocutory matter, and a 28 U.S.C §1292(b) motion may be just the ticket to get it done.

How to file:

To file a 1292(b) motion, you need two parts. First, you need to file a motion in district court for "leave" to appeal the matter in question. While not strictly required, it is a good idea to include in the motion a section detailing the cause and thrust of why the appeal is warranted. For maximum effect, don't attack the decision of the judge en face, instead show how there is a genuine question of law.

Concurrently, you must file with the Appeals Court within ten days of the underlying District Court decision that gave rise to the appeal. This can be confusing, and there is conflicting holdings on whether you must file for leave to appeal in the Appeals Court AFTER the District Court certifies the matter for appeal (10 days from that order), or 10 days after the entry of the District Court order against which the appeal is sought. Answer: 10 days from the order against which the appeal is sought. This process is called "lodging." No fee is paid, but the right to appeal is preserved in the event the District Court does certify the appeal. Only then will you be required to pay the appeals fee and the Appeals Court will then consider the matter. By the way, you enter your appeal through CM/ECF via the utility option. You won't receive any notice of acceptance until after the clerk manually reviews the filing -- this can be very confusing if you are filing at the last moment (ahem).

The filing with the Appeals Court must include a copy of the underlying order from which the appeal is drawn, or the appeals case will be rejected. Similarly, you must include a corporate statement and certification that you have conferred with opposing counsel when filing the appeal. DO NOT miss those two attachments, or your filing is toast.

Do you have a question regarding a federal appeal? Give us a ring! We have considerable experience in federal court and would be glad to discuss your case. 1-800-579-9864.

Hanover Law, PC
Offices in Fairfax, VA and Washington, DC
www.hanoverlawpc.com
2751 Prosperity Ave, Ste 150
Fairfax, VA 22031
Sean R. Hanover, Esq.
Stephen Salwierak, Esq.
Lili O'connell, Esq.
Charles Hatley, Esq.
1-800-579-9864 admin@hanoverlawpc.com

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

When the judge becomes a recalcitrant -- how to protect your client

While speaking with several great colleagues on the AILA (American Immigration Lawyers Association) discussion boards, I had a chance to share my experiences working with judges who would not allow testimony in the immigration court context. I was asked how I handled such judges -- specifically regarding asylum matters -- and I thought I would share my answer here:

I have run into this -- even the judge not wanting fact witnesses to testify. Let me explain an example regarding immigration and asylum law. In each instance, though, you need to find the underlying law that supports the right of your client to be heard. When that is lacking -- do not fear! Press on with an equity argument and use the same language. The key is putting your concern on the record, as you will see below.

State for the record that your expert's testimony is critical to the foundation and credibility of your case. Further, state that the judge is obligated to hear all facts that bear on the risk of abuse or harm.

“Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is not discretionary. The Attorney General is not permitted to deport an alien to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the protected grounds . . . .” Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001); INA 241(b)(3)(A).

If the judge refuses to hear from the expert (or fact witness), object on the record. Then continue. I have won more than one appeal on this objection. Note, though, you MUST note the purpose of the expert (or fact witness) and then object when the judge does not permit it. Also note that if the judge only allows a cursory examination of the fact witness or expert, then that can also qualify for grounds for appeal if you object on the record.

Examples of how to note your objection on the record:

you must introduce the witness or expert and explain what testimony he/she will provide and why it is critical to your case. If the judge does not give you a chance to do this, state, "Your Honor, may I be heard on this matter?" If the judge still refuses, then you must state: "You Honor, for the record, I must state that your refusal to permit XXX to testify prevents you from having a full and complete picture of Mr. XXXX withholding and asylum petition. I object to this."

If the judge allows you to proffer what the witness or expert will testify (that means make a statement on the record indicating what facts will be discussed), and then refuses to permit the testimony, you must state: "You Honor, I understand your ruling on this matter. However, for the record, I must object as I believe it is not possible to have a full and complete hearing on Mr. XXX withholding and asylum petition without this information."
That's it! You've preserved the record for appeal, and stand a good chance of reversing the holding.

Hanover Law, PC
Offices in Fairfax, VA and Washington, DC
www.hanoverlawpc.com Lili O'connell, Esq.
Abby Archer, Esq.
888 16th St., NW Ste 800
Washington, DC 20006
2751 Prosperity Ave, Ste 580
Fairfax, VA 22031
Sean R. Hanover, Esq.
Stephen Salwierak, Esq.
1-800-579-9864 admin@hanoverlawpc.com Charles Hatley, Esq.

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Gang Asylum-Withholding Cases (second post)

In my previous posting, I shared relevant case law governing BIA decisions in gang related asylum/withholding I-589 cases. I now turn to a discussion on how to argue the actual case. For security and privacy purposes, the name of the petitioner is removed. However, this material can be used as a tool for organizing a logical appeal brief. For brevity sake, footnotes have been excluded. Contact me for case information located in the footnotes.

A. CRITERIA 1: Immutable characteristic In the December 2007 Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Law Advisor, the article, Gang Violence and Asylum: The Problem of Defining a Particular Social Group by Ms. Katherine A. Smith, discusses the immutable aspect of gang membership. She argues: ...[O]ne view is that a group consisting of former gang members meets the immutable characteristic test because former membership is a characteristic of the past that cannot be changed. For example, in Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F. 3d 770 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit found that former employees of the Columbian Attorney General’s office belonged to a particular social group….The Court found that the status of being a former employee distinguished the case from the claimed social group of uncorrupt prosecutors who were subject to persecution….Former gang members are also a clearly defined discrete group of people. (Id., page 3)

In Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 502 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit sites to In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) suggesting that individuals who deny their membership in a group (in this instance, a tribe) and oppose prevailing organizations or practices can be considered a social class .

Mr. Anonymous was a member of a known and clearly defined gang, the Hot Skulls (Oral Decision, transcript, page 4). In turn, the gang was part of a larger organization, with ties to the government, called “Beast of the Southern World” (Testimony, transcript, page 52, 56). Petitioner “turned his back” on the gang as a requisite for coming to the United States. He was required to renounce gang affiliation, despite knowing what happened to those that did so, and despite receiving demands for money and payment to be allowed to leave. (Testimony, transcript, pages 53-55) The Immigration Judge found Mr. Anonymous ’s testimony to be credible (Oral Decision, transcript, page 9). Petitioner has demonstrated he was part of an immutable group in two capacities: (a) he was a former gang members, and (b) he was part of a specific, clearly defined group that renounced gang membership in favor of leading a normal productive life, and received death threats and promises of violence as a result (“I mean they will hurt you. They will kill you, definitely”, Testimony, transcript, page 55) .

The 9th Circuit case, Artega v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir., 2007), stated that gang membership, in and of itself, does not constitute a cognizable group for immigration purposes. However, the present appeal is distinguished from that holding in that membership in a gang is only the precursor to the requirement that the gang be renounced (you cannot be part of a socially recognized group that renouncing gang membership unless you are, de facto, a member of a gang). Additionally, in Guyana, gang membership is a form of social unit whether appealing to our culture or not. To discount a social unit, regardless of their function, is an anathema to immigration and refugee law. Whether the immutable aspect of gang membership alone is sufficient to create a social group in and of itself is debatable (as Artega suggests it is not). That it satisfies the requirement for the first criteria of the Board’s social group definition is not.

B. CRITERIA 2: Visibility According to Smith (EOIR Immigration Law Advisor), “[t]he issue is whether members of society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a group. Factors in this analysis include whether there are additional indentifying characteristics…” (Id., at 4). The “Hot Skulls” and the “Beast of the Southern World” are well known, active gangs in the Georgetown area of Guyana. Gang violence, and recognition of gang activity is well known, and common place in Georgetown, Guyana . While it is generally accepted these gangs exist, and Guyanese society as a whole recognizes the public, visible nature of the gangs in question, the question remains whether Mr. Anonymous ’s involvement with the gangs needs to be public and visible such that he should be included in the gangs themselves. In this instance, petitioner argues this is not necessary. Mr. Anonymous does not attempt to identify with the gangs any further. It his opposition to a well known, public gang, that gives rise to the social group he wishes to claim. Petitioner’s public admission that he was “out of the gang” and his renunciation of gang activity , is itself a public declaration, and immediately places him in direct and firm opposition to a recognized drug gang. Further, his public implementation of that declaration, by leaving the gang and never coming back, demonstrates an act which gives substance to his statements. It is not necessary that Mr. Anonymous be harmed in order for his public declaration of gang disaffiliation to be operative . Operative for visibility is: (a) that the petitioner was a member of a discreet, known gang; (b) that a clear statement was made, publically and visibly, against gang membership; (c) that substantive action was taken to implement the public declaration. Mr. Anonymous meets these elements.

C. CRITERIA 3: Particularity Particularity requires more than just common danger, or gross generalization. To specify a group with particular characteristics requires clearly defined, articulable, characteristics that when viewed as a whole, clearly delineate a subset of society (see generally, Immigration Law Review, 2007, page 4 citing to Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir., 2005)). (a) Clearly Defined: Mr. Anonymous belongs to a unique, defined sub-group – individuals who were once gang members and who have now renounced their membership, openly, publically, and have taken material, substantive steps to enact their renunciation; further, they have suffered some harm or have been threatened as a result of that renunciation and the steps so taken . (b) Articulable: In contrast to Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir., 2005), Mr. Anonymous ’s social group characteristics are not “amorphous” or vague. Guyanese and even United Nation reports of events in the region, news and public literature supports and recognizes this group (former gang members who renounce their affiliation and take substantive steps to implement the renunciation) as a valuable contribution to civil society, and key to fixing the gang problems in the Caribbean, and Guyana in specific . In this case the very social group in question is recognized by the Guyanese government as key to fixing the gang problem in the country .

D. CRITERIA 4: Harm The likelihood of gang members who renounce their gang affiliation being harmed by the gang they left if they return is significant . Matter of Enamorado, unpublished Immigration Court decision, November 22, 1999, A#77530541, at page 26. “[I]n this particular case, members of “MS”, in fact see persons such as Edwin, i.e., individuals who are former gang members, as having characteristics that warrants suppression or the infliction of harm….As a result, the court finds that Edwin’s status as a past member of the “MS” does entitle him to be treated as a member of a particular social group.” ) See also Matter of -, CGRS Case #4158, IJ Decision, Eloy, AZ (February 17, 2005) stating that a gang member who attempted to leave his gang and remove his tattoos could be considered a refugee. Under oath, Mr. Anonymous gave credible testimony that he would serious, even fatal harm, if he were to return to Guyana having turned his back on his former gang. Q: Did anybody in your gang ever try to quit? A: Well, yes. We had one guy that, that I remember. He try to quit and it didn’t work out so nice for him, when he – they beat him real badly, you know. They almost killed the young man, and he didn’t quit anyway. (Transcript, page 50).

… Q: Do you know anything about the Beast of the Southern World? Do ou know anything about that group, at all?
A: Well, I know that if you try to steal from them, and you try to disobey them, you know, it’s nothing nice about it. They will, you know, they will terrorize your family. They will kill you, torture you. I mean, the guys was rough. They, I mean, they were no joke. (Transcript, pages 52-53)
…
Q: Before you left Guyana, to come to the United States, in December of 1989, did you tell your gang anything?
A: Well, yes. I told a few guys, that I was very close, but I couldn’t tell all of them, because, you know, they, they don’t like when you departure. I told a few of my friends, the ones that was close, that you know guys, I’m leaving, you know, and I got to go, and they, they, you know, they wasn’t too happy with the situation, because, you know one of the members leaving, so they asked me to, when I get there, when I get to America, and I get situated, if I should, I mean, I should support them, you know, with some funds, but you know, when I got here, I didn’t do such thing. I just, I just forget all about them. I turn my back on them, as we speak. (Transcript, page 54)
…
Q: Would you describe what would happened to you if you returned to Guyana now after what you told the gang when you left?
A: Well, they will, they will kill me, because simple fact I, I ain’t send them a penny. I didn’t support them in nothing. I just turned my back and they don’t like that. I mean, if you disobey orders from your crew members, it’s, it’s something terrible. I mean, they will hurt you. They will kill you, definitely. (Transcript, page 55)
The testimony supports a serious and credible fear of harm if petitioner returns. It should be noted that the Immigration Judge felt that they likelihood of the individuals with whom Mr. Anonymous was associated when he was in the gang, hurting him now was remote (Oral Decision, Transcript, page 9). However, this mistakenly assumes that gang memory is localized to merely the individuals who were “friends” or associates of Mr. Anonymous . We argue that the gang, as an organization, remembers and would persecute Mr. Anonymous even if the original individual members of the gang are no longer active.
E. CRITERIA 5: Cultural Perspective Country based perspective is a matter of fact and research. Arguably, each culture has its own view of what constitutes a group, and what constitutes persecution. While not controlling on whether any one alleged social group should indeed be considered a group, cultural “opinion” can help explain “norms” that define acceptable conduct, or behavior that defines group activities. Gangs are a known social element in Guyana and they are not welcome. Gang violence is not just perception – it is reality. Guyana has an epidemic of gang related problems, and more than 70% of the population feels that the government is unable, or unwilling, to change the criminal effect gangs have on communities, institutions, and corruption within the state . Approximately 29% of Guyanese feel that gangs are problem in their neighborhood . Over 50% feel less than secure or very unsafe . 13% of youth report being involved in serious criminal activity (more than any other Caribbean country) .
Those former gang members that break-out of the gangs and renounce violence are viewed as a cognizable, acceptable group that is contributes to the stabilization and betterment of the Guyanese society. Petitioner argues they have same status as ex-convicts who have completed their sentence and are rehabilitated.

Do you have an appeal (BIA or Federal case) that would benefit from a thorough review? Asylum/Withholding/CAT claims are tricky, and require experience to properly argue -- and even more so to win on appeal. While no appeal is guaranteed, there are key writing styles/approaches that can make a significant different. Contact us! We can help you ensure the highest possibility of success. When deportation or jail/detention is at stake -- it pays to have an expert help.

S

Sean R. Hanover, Esq
HanoverLawPC.com
Contact Us
703-402-2723

Gang Asylum-Withholding Cases

Our firm recently submitted an I-589 asylum/withholding appeal for a client that was involved in gangs while living in Guyana. Our BIA appeal centered on what is considered a "social group" for purposes of withholding. We argued that, "former gang members who have publically renounced their gang affiliation and taken substantive steps to effect the renunciation" are a discreet social group warranting protection.

This is the first of a two part posting on the topic. This first post covers current cases (we are located in the 4th (Federal) Circuit -- The 4th Circuit has upheld BIA’s definition process for social groups. Citing to the same cases outlined in the text below, the Court stated: “Neither the relevant statute nor its associated regulations specifically define the term "particular social group." We therefore defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the term.” (citing to Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 654 (4th Cir. 2009)). Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440 at 446-447 (4th Cir. 2011))

Summary:

1. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) constitutes the over-arching case which controls the premise upon which “social groups” are defined. This case has not been overturned by any Federal Court, and BIA continues to refer to Matter of Acosta when considering matters pertaining to social groups.

2. To qualify for inclusion in a protected group, an individual must be a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. (supra, at 233).

3. In Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA, 2006), the Board updated its approach to defining social groups by expressing that one factor to be considered is the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the characteristics in question as members of a group. (supra, at 957, stating: “we have considered as a relevant factor the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social group.”). This was strongly re-affirmed in 2008, when the Board summarized the “society perception” concept into one word: visibility. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 586 (BIA, 2008).

4. Yet another key characteristic of defining a viable, social group acceptable for purposes of refugee, asylum, and withholding purposes is whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA, 2007). For the purposes of particularity, this case discusses whether “wealth”, “affluence”, or more generally monetary standing constitutes a sufficient discriminator for group definition; the Board held it did not, and discussed the need for specificity as a core characteristic of social group definition.

The respondents’ proposed social group is indeterminate, and not just at the margins, as will often be the case in describing group membership. Rather, when “wealth” is the sole criterion, group membership is difficult to delimit for a large swath of potential members. The characteristic of wealth or affluence is simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for membership in a particular social group. (supra, at 76)

The essence of the “particularity” requirement, therefore, is whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized in the society in question, as a discrete person. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA, 2008).

5. Two additional characteristics of social groups were teased out of the Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U case when the Board issued its decision in 2007. Specifically, that the level of harm incurred is relevant to group definition, and that all other factors must be taken in the context of the country in question (from which refugee, asylum or withholding is sought), and the type/nature of persecution alleged. Referring to the 2002 Guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Board wrote: Although a social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm, we noted that this may be a relevant factor in considering the group’s visibility in society. Id. at 960 [reference to UNHCR report] (supra, 74).

Further clarifying the “social visibility” doctrine enunciated in Matter of C-A-, the Board explained: Whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite “social visibility” must be considered in the context of the country of concern and the persecution feared. (Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, at 74, Social Visibility).

6. In summary, over the period of 1985 – 2008, the Board has established the following criteria for defining social groups :



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